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Abstract
This paper studies the secure beamforming design in a multiple-antenna three-node system where
two source nodes exchange messages with the help of an untrusted relay node. The relay acts as both
an essential signal forwarder and a potential eavesdropper. Both two-phase and three-phase two-way
relay strategies are considered. Our goal is to jointly optimize the source and relay beamformers for
maximizing the secrecy sum rate of the two-way communications. We first derive the optimal relay
beamformer structures. Then, iterative algorithms are proposed to find source and relay beamformers
jointly based on alternating optimization. Furthermore, we conduct asymptotic analysis on the maximum
secrecy sum-rate. Our analysis shows that when all transmit powers approach infinity, the two-phase two-
way relay scheme achieves the maximum secrecy sum rate if the source beamformers are designed such
that the received signals at the relay align in the same direction. This reveals an important advantage of
signal alignment technique in against eavesdropping. It is also shown that if the source powers approach
zero the three-phase scheme performs the best while the two-phase scheme is even worse than direct
transmission. Simulation results have verified the efficiency of the secure beamforming algorithms as
well as the analytical findings.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Cooperative relaying has been shown effective for power reduction, coverage extension and
throughput enhancement in wireless communications. Recently, with the advance of wireless
information-theoretic security at the physical layer, a new dimension arises for the design of
relaying strategies. In specific, from a perspective of physical-layer security, a relay can be
friendly and may help to keep the confidential message from being eavesdropped by others,
while an untrusted relay may intentionally eavesdrop the signal when relaying. The case of
untrusted relay exists in real life. For example, the relays and sources belong to different network
in today’s heterogenous network, where the nodes have different security clearances and thus
different levels of access to the information. It is therefore important to find out whether the
untrusted relay is still beneficial compared with direct transmission and if so what is the new
relay strategy.
The goal of this work is to study the physical layer security in two-way relay systems
where the relay is untrusted and each node is equipped with multiple antennas. Compared
with traditional one-way relaying, the problem in two-way relaying is more interesting. This is
because by applying physical layer network coding, the relay only needs to decode the network-
coded message rather than each individual message and hence the network coding procedure
itself also brings certain security. We will try to address three important questions. First, under
what conditions, should we treat the two-way untrusted relay as a passive eavesdropper or seek
help from it? This is a challenging problem because different power constraints and antennas
configurations may result in different answers. Second, if help is necessary, how to jointly
optimize the source and relay beamformers? Typically this would be a non-convex problem
and very difficult to solve. Thirdly, would physical layer network coding, originally known for
throughput enhancement in two-way relay systems, bring new insights to the new performance
metric of information security?
B. Related Work
We first briefly review the existing works related to beamforming design in MIMO two-way
relay systems without taking secrecy into account. Then according to the relay being trusted or
untrusted, we classify the related work on secure communication in relay systems.
31) Beamforming in MIMO Two-way Relay Systems: When the source nodes are each equipped
with a single antenna, [2] proposed the optimal relay beamforming structure and a convex
optimization algorithm to find the capacity region. For the case of multi-antenna uses, the problem
is much more difficult. The work [3] showed an optimal structure of the relay precoding matrix
and proposed an alternating optimization method (optimize the relay precoding matrix and source
precoding matrices alternatively) to maximize the achievable weighted sum rate. Based on another
criterion of mean-square-errer (MSE), [4] proposed an iterative method for the joint source and
relay precoding design.
2) Trusted Relay: In this case, the relay is a legitimate user or acts like a legitimate user who
will help to counter external eavesdroppers and increase the security of the networks. Most of
the work has focused on traditional one-way relaying secret communication (e.g., [5]–[11]).
Only a few attempts have been made very recently to study two-way relaying secret communi-
cation [12]–[16]. Specifically, [12] and [13] investigated the relay and jammer selection problem
in the two-way relay networks. The authors in [14] studied beamforming design in MIMO two-
way relaying for maximizing secrecy sum rate which is proven to be achievable in [17]. Joint
distributed beamforming and power allocation was considered in [15] for maximizing secrecy
sum rate in two-way relaying networks with multiple single-antenna relays. Several secret key
agreement schemes were proposed in [16].
3) Untrusted Relay: Untrusted relay channels with confidential messages was first studied
in [18], where an achievable secrecy rate was obtained. A destination-based jamming (DBJ)
technique was proposed in [19], [20] without source-destination link. The performance of DBJ
in fading channel and multi-relay scenarios was analyzed in [21]. When the source-destination
link exists, authors in [22] discussed whether cooperating with the untrusted relay is better
than treating it as a passive eavesdropper. A Stackelberg game between the two sources and
the external friendly jammers in a two-way relay system was formulated as a power control
scheme in [23]. In [24], the authors considered MIMO one-way amplify-and-forward (AF) relay
systems and jointly deigned the source and relay beamforming using alternating optimization.
[25] examines the secrecy outage probability in one-way non-regenerative relay systems.
From these existing literature, it is found that the problem of joint source and relay beam-
forming for MIMO two-way untrusted relaying has not been considered yet.
4C. Contribution
In this paper, we investigate physical layer security in MIMO two-way relay systems, where
the two sources exchange confidential information with each other through an untrusted relay.
The relay acts as both an essential helper and a potential eavesdropper, but does not make
any malicious attack. In our previous work [1], we considered the two-phase scheme. In this
extension, we study both two-phase and three-phase two-way relay schemes. In particular, we
formulate the joint secure source and relay beamforming design for each two-way relay scheme.
The objective is to maximize the secrecy sum rate of the bidirectional links subject to the source
and relay power constraints. Furthermore, we conduct asymptotic analysis on maximum secrecy
sum rate of the different two-way relay schemes in comparison with direct transmission.
The main contributions and results of this paper are summarized as follows:
• The optimal structure of the relay beamforming matrix for fixed source beamformers is
derived. With this structure, the number of unknowns in the relay beamformer is significantly
reduced and thus the joint source and relay beamformer design can be simplified.
• Iterative algorithms based on alternating optimization are proposed to find a solution of
the joint source and relay beamformers. These algorithms are convergent but cannot ensure
global optimality due to the nonconvexity of the optimization problems.
• Via asymptotic analysis, we show that when the powers of the source and relay nodes
approach infinity, the two-phase scheme achieves the maximum secrecy rate if the transceiver
beamformers are designed such that the received signals at the relay align in the same
direction. This reveals an important advantage of signal alignment techniques in against
eavesdropping. It gives a new perspective to achieve the physical layer security, and also
lowers the source antenna number requirement for ensuring security.
• It is also shown via asymptotic analysis that when the power of the relay goes to infinity
and that of the two sources approach zeros, the three-phase two-way relay scheme performs
the best while the two-phase performs even worse than direct transmission.
D. Organization and Notations
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model and
problem formulations. The optimal secure beamformers for two- and three-phase two-way relay
5schemes are presented in Section III. Asymptotical results are detailed in Section IV. Compre-
hensive simulation results are given in Section V. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section
VI.
Notations: Scalars, vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-case, lower-case bold-face and
upper-case bold-face letters, respectively. [x]+ denotes max (0, x). Tr(A),A−1, Rank(A), ‖A‖F ,
A∗ and AH denote the trace, inverse, rank, Frobenius norm, conjugate and Hermite of matrix
A, respectively. span(A) represents the column space (range space) of A and dim(A) denotes
the dimension of A. The projection matrix onto the null space of A is denoted by AN . ‖q‖
denotes the norm of the vector q. σmax(A) is the largest singular value of A. λmax(A) is the
largest eigenvalue of the matrix A and ψmax(A) is the eigenvector of A corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue. λmax(A,B) is the largest generalized eigenvalue of the matrices A and B.
ψmax(A,B) is the generalized eigenvector of (A,B) corresponding to the largest generalized
eigenvalue. We use PDTi , P 2Pi and P 3Pi to represent the transmit power of node i ∈ {A,B,R}
in two-way direct transmission, two-phase two-way relaying and three-phase two-way relaying,
respectively. Throughout this paper, ni denotes the zero mean circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian noise vector at node i ∈ {A,B,R} with ni ∼ CN (0, I).
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a two-way relay system as shown in Fig. 1, where two source nodes A and B
exchange information with each other with the assistance of a relay node R. The relay acts as both
an essential helper and a potential eavesdropper but does not make any malicious attack. Note
that the decode-and-forward (DF) relay strategy is not applicable here since the relay is untrusted
and not expected to decode the received signal from the source nodes. As such, we assume the
relay adopts AF strategy, which also has low complexity. The number of antennas at nodes A,
B and R are denoted as NA, NB and NR, respectively. As shown in Fig. 1, TA ∈ CNB×NA ,
TB ∈ CNA×NB , HA ∈ CNR×NA , GA ∈ CNA×NR , HB ∈ CNR×NB , GB ∈ CNB×NR denote the
channel matrices of link A→ B, B → A, A→ R, R→ A, B → R and R→ B, respectively. If
the system operates in time division duplex (TDD) mode and channel reciprocity holds, then we
have TA = TTB , HA = GTA, and HB = GTB . For simplicity, we only consider single data stream
for each source node in this paper. Denote the transmitted symbol at the source i as si ∈ C with
E(|si|2) = 1, and the associated beamforming vector as qi ∈ CNi×1, for i ∈ {A,B}.
6Different two-way relay schemes have been studied in the literature [26], [27]. In this paper,
we study the two-phase and three-phase two-way relay schemes. For the purpose of comparison,
the two-way direct transmission is also considered in Appendix A, wherein the relay node is
treated as a pure eavesdropper [24], [28].
A. Two-Phase Two-Way Relay Scheme
In the first phase of the two-phase two-way relay scheme, A and B simultaneously transmit
signals to the relay node R. The received signal at relay is,
y2PR = HAqAsA +HBqBsB + nR. (1)
In the second phase, the relay node amplifies y2PR by multiplying it with a precoding matrix F
and broadcasts it to both A and B. The transmit signal vector from the relay node is expressed
as
x2PR = Fy
2P
R . (2)
After subtracting the back propagated self-interference, each source node i obtains the equiv-
alent received signals,
y2Pi = GiFHi¯qi¯si¯ +GiFnR + ni, i ∈ {A,B}, (3)
where i¯ = {A,B} \ i.
The information rate from node i to node i¯ is
R2Pi¯i =
1
2
log2
(
1 + qHi H
H
i F
HGHi¯ K
−1
i¯
Gi¯FHiqi
)
, (4)
where
Ki¯ = Gi¯FF
HGHi¯ + I. (5)
If the untrusted relay wants to eavesdrop the signals from both source nodes, it may try to fully
decode the two messages sA and sB. Therefore, the achievable information rate at the untrusted
relay can be expressed as the maximum sum-rate of a two-user MIMO multiple-access channel,
7given by
R2PR , I
(
y2PR ; sA, sB
)
=
1
2
log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣I+
[
HAqA HBqB
]qHAHHA
qHBH
H
B


∣∣∣∣∣∣
(a)
=
1
2
log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣I+

qHAHHA
qHBH
H
B

[HAqA HBqB ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 + qHAH
H
AHAqA q
H
AH
H
AHBqB
qHBH
H
BHAqA 1 + q
H
BH
H
BHBqB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
log2
(
1 + ‖HAqA‖2 + ‖HBqB‖2
+‖HAqA‖2‖HBqB‖2 − ‖qHBHHBHAqA‖2
)
. (6)
where (a) is from the identity |I+AB| = |I+BA|.
The achievable secrecy sum rate [17] of the two source nodes is thus given by,
R2Ps =
[R2PAB +R2PBA −R2PR ]+ (7)
Our goal is to maximize the secrecy sum rate by jointly optimizing the relay and source
beamformers F, qA and qB . The problem can be formulated as
max
{F,qA,qB}
R2Ps (8a)
s. t. ‖qi‖2 ≤ P 2Pi , i ∈ {A,B}, (8b)
Tr
(
FHAqAq
H
AH
H
AF
H + FHBqBq
H
BH
H
BF
H
+ FFH
) ≤ P 2PR . (8c)
where (8c) is the relay power constraint.
B. Three-Phase Two-Way Relay Scheme
In the first phase of the three-phase two-way relay scheme, source node A transmits. The
received signals at the relay R and the source node B are respectively given by
y3PR1 = HAqAsA + nR1, (9)
y3PB1 = TAqAsA + nB1. (10)
8where nR1 and nB1 are the noises at the relay node and source node B in the first phase,
respectively.
In the second phase, node B transmits. The received signals at the relay and the source node
A are respectively given by
y3PR2 = HBqBsB + nR2, (11)
y3PA1 = TBqBsB + nA1. (12)
where nR2 and nA1 are the noises at the relay node and source node A in the second phase,
respectively.
In the third phase, the relay node R amplifies the received signals y3PR1 and y3PR2 by multiplying
them with FA and FB , respectively. The broadcast signal from the relay is thus
x3PR = FAy
3P
R1 + FBy
3P
R2. (13)
After subtracting the self-interference, the two source nodes obtain the signals as
y3PA2 = GAFBHBqBsB +GA (FAnR1 + FBnR2) + nA2, (14)
y3PB2 = GBFAHAqAsA +GB (FAnR1 + FBnR2) + nB2. (15)
Combining (12) and (14), we obtain the information rate from B to A as,
R3PBA , I(y3PA1,y3PA2; sB) (16)
=
1
3
log2
(
1 + qHBT
H
BTBqB + q
H
BH
H
BF
H
BG
H
A ·(
GA
(
FAF
H
A + FBF
H
B
)
GHA + I
)−1
GAFBHBqB
)
.
Likewise, the information rate from A to B is,
R3PAB =
1
3
log2
(
1 + qHAT
H
ATAqA + q
H
AH
H
AF
H
AG
H
B ·(
GB
(
FAF
H
A + FBF
H
B
)
GHB + I
)−1
GBFAHAqA
)
.
The information sum rate leaked to the untrusted relay can be obtained from (9) and (11):
R3PR , I(y3PR1; sA) + I(y3PR2; sB) (17)
=
1
3
log2
((
1 + qHAH
H
AHAqA
) (
1 + qHBH
H
BHBqB
))
9Thus, the secrecy sum rate is given by
R3Ps = [R3PBA +R3PAB −R3PR ]+. (18)
We can formulate the secrecy sum rate maximization problem for three-phase two-way relay
scheme as
max
{FA,FB ,qA,qB}
R3Ps (19a)
s. t. ‖qi‖2 ≤ P 3Pi , i ∈ {A,B}, (19b)
Tr
(
FAHAqAq
H
AH
H
AF
H
A + FBHBqBq
H
BH
H
BF
H
B
+ FAF
H
A + FBF
H
B
)
≤ P 3PR , (19c)
where (19c) is the relay power constraint.
In these two schemes, we assume that one of the source nodes, say A is responsible for the joint
design of source and relay beamformers. After finishing the design, A sends the corresponding
designed beamformer to B and the relay. Then, the two source nodes and the untrusted relay
will use their beamformers to process the transmit signals.
III. SECURE BEAMFOMRING DESIGNS
After introducing the problem formulations in (8) and (19) for the two-phase and three-
phase two-way relay schemes, respectively, we now present algorithms to design these secure
beamformers in this section.
A. Secure Beamforming in Two-Phase Two-Way Relay Scheme
We first obtain the optimal structure of the secure relay beamforming matrix F. Then we
present an iterative algorithm to find a local optimal solution for the joint secure source and
relay beamformers. Define the following two QR decompositions:
[GHA G
H
B ] = VR
2P
1 , (20)
[HAqA HBqB] = UR
2P
2 . (21)
where V ∈ CNR×min{NA+NB ,NR}, U ∈ CNR×2 are orthonormal matrices and R2P1 , R2P2 are upper
triangle matrices.
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Lemma 1. In the two-phase two-way relay scheme, the optimal relay beamforming matrix F ∈
CNR×NR that maximizes the secrecy sum rate has the following structure:
F = VAUH, (22)
where A ∈ Cmin{NA+NB ,NR}×2 is an unknown matrix.
Proof: Note that the relay beamforming matrix F only influences the information rate R2PAB
and R2PBA. Therefore, the optimal F that maximize the secrecy sum rate is actually the same to
the F that maximizes the information sum rate R2PAB +R2PBA. Due to the rank-one precoding at
each source node, we have the equivalent channel Hiqi from source node i to relay. Therefore,
applying the results in [3], we readily have Lemma 1.
According to Lemma 1, the number of unknowns in F is reduced from N2R to 2min{NR, NA+
NB}, which reduces the computational complexity of the joint source and relay beamforming
design.
We note that it is not easy to find the optimal solution to the problem (8). Even after substituting
the optimal structure of F (22) into (7), the problem is still nonconvex since the secrecy sum
rate is not a convex function of qA, qB and A. Therefore, we optimize the source beamforming
vectors qA, qB and the unknown matrix A in the relay beamforming matrix F in an alternating
manner. Given qA and qB , we use the gradient method shown in Appendix B to search A. Given
F and qi, we can find the optimal qi¯, where the optimization method is shown in Appendix
C. Formally, we present the method in Algorithm 1 as follows. Here, the initial points of the
complex vectors qA and qB can be randomly generated as long as they satisfy the given power
constraint.
Algorithm 1 Iterative algorithm for secure beamforming in two-phase two-way relay scheme
1: Initialize A, qA and qB .
2: Repeat
(a) Optimize A given qA and qB based on gradient method given in Appendix B;
(b) Optimize qB given A and qA according to Appendix C;
(c) Optimize qA given A and qB according to Appendix C by swapping A and B;
3: Until the secrecy sum rate does not increase.
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Note that the algorithm always converges because the secrecy sum rate is finite and does not
decrease in every iteration.
B. Secure Beamforming in Three-Phase Two-Way Relay Scheme
Similar to the two-phase case, we define the following QR decomposition:
[GHA G
H
B ] = VR
3P , (23)
where V ∈ CNR×min{NA+NB,NR} is an orthonormal matrix and R3P ∈ Cmin{NA+NB,NR}×(NA+NB)
is an upper triangle matrix. Then we give the optimal structure of the relay beamforming matrices
FA and FB in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. In the three-phase two-way relay scheme, the optimal relay beamforming matrices
FA, FB that maximize the secrecy sum rate have the following structure:
FA = Va1
(HAqA)
H
‖HAqA‖ , FB = Va2
(HBqB)
H
‖HBqB‖ , (24)
where a1 ∈ Cmin{NA+NB ,NR}×1, a2 ∈ Cmin{NA+NB ,NR}×1 are unknown vectors.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Lemma 2 simplifies the design of two beamforming matrices Fi to the design of two beam-
forming vectors ai. Thus, the number of unknowns is reduced to 2min{NR, NA+NB}. Note that
the number of unknowns in the relay beamforming matrices is the same for two- and three-phase
schemes.
Lemma 1 and 2 show that the optimal relay beamforming contains three parts: (i) matching to
the received signal; (ii) combination or other operation of the information-bearing signals; (iii)
beamforming to the intended receiver. This structure is similar to the optimal relay beamforming
structure in other systems, for example, the two-way relaying system without secrecy constraint
in [2], [3] and one-way relaying system with secrecy constraint in [24]. These structure are also
used in our following asymptotical analysis.
Since problem (19) is also nonconvex, we adopt the iterative method to obtain a solution where
qA, qB, a1 and a2 are alternatively optimized until the secrecy sum rate does not increase. The
algorithm, denoted as Algorithm 2, is very similar to the Algorithm 1 and omitted.
Since the problems (8) and (19) are both nonconvex, the iterative algorithms presented in
the previous section cannot ensure global optimality. However, letting the transmit power on
12
each node approach zero or infinity, we can derive interesting intuitions which lead to the
asymptotically optimal solution for secure beamforming. In the next section, we present such
asymptotic analysis.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
The goal of this section is to find the asymptotical optimal secure beamforming design when
the relay power PR approaches infinity. We first present the analysis when the two source powers
are also infinite in Subsection IV-A, followed by the analysis when the two source powers
approach zero in Subsection IV-B. Finally, we briefly discuss the case where the relay power
PR approaches zero. For comparison purpose, the asymptotic result for the direct transmission
is presented in this section as well.
A. The Case of High Relay and Source Powers
Proposition 1 (2P). When PR → ∞, PA → ∞ and PB → ∞, the maximum secrecy sum rate
of the two-phase two-way relay scheme is,
R2Pmax
≈


max
(qA,qB)∈S
1
2
log2
‖HAqA‖2‖HBqB‖2
‖HAqA‖2 + ‖HBqB‖2
,
if NA +NB > NR,
1
2
log2
1
1− (σmax(UHAUB))2
, if NA +NB ≤ NR,
, (25)
where set S is {(qA,qB) : ∃β ∈ R, βHAqA = HBqB
and ‖qA‖2 ≤ PA, ‖qB‖2 ≤ PB}, σmax(UHAUB) is the maximum singular value of matrix
UHAUB , UA ∈ CNR×min{NA,NR} and UB ∈ CNR×min{NB ,NR} are obtained from the QR de-
composition of HA and HB, respectively, i.e.,
Hi = UiRi, i ∈ {A,B}, (26)
where Ri ∈ Cmin{NR,Ni}×Ni are upper triangle matrices.
Proof: We first prove the following fact:
When PR →∞, the information rate from i to i¯ in two-phase two-way relay scheme is
lim
PR→∞
R2Pi¯i =
1
2
log2
(
1 + qHi H
H
i Hiqi
)
, (27)
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To prove (27), we first plug in the optimal structure of F to (4) and let F = tVAUH where
t is a real number. When PR →∞, we just let t→∞. Thus,
qHi H
H
i F
HGH
i¯
K−1
i¯
Gi¯FHiqi
= qHi H
H
i tUA
HVHGH
i¯
(
t
2Gi¯VAA
HVHGH
i¯
+ I
)
−1 ·
Gi¯tVAU
HHiqi
(a)
= qHi H
H
i U
(
I− (I+ t2AHVHGH
i¯
Gi¯VA
)
−1
)
UHHiqi
= qHi H
H
i UU
HHiqi − qHi HHi U
(
I+ t2AHVHGH
i¯
Gi¯VA
)
−1 ·
UHHiqi
(b)
= qHi H
H
i Hiqi − qHi HHi U
(
I+ t2AHVHGH
i¯
Gi¯VA
)
−1
UHHiqi
where (a) is from the matrix inverse lemma and (b) is from QR decomposition (21). Since
nodes A, B and R all have multiple antennas, we have Rank (Gi¯) ≥ 2 with probability
1 as every element of Gi¯ are drawn from continuous distribution. Therefore, it is always
possible to find A such that
(
AHVHGH
i¯
Gi¯VA
) ∈ C2×2 is positive definite matrix. Hence,
the eigenvalue of
(
I+ t2AHVHGH
i¯
Gi¯VA
)
approaches positive infinity when t → ∞. As
a result, the term qHi HHi U
(
I+ t2AHVHGH
i¯
Gi¯VA
)−1
UHHiqi approaches zero and we ob-
tain that when PR →∞, R2Pi¯i ≥ 12 log2
(
1 + qHi H
H
i Hiqi
)
. In addition, it is easy to see that
lim
PR→∞
R2P
i¯i
≤ 1
2
log2
(
1 + qHi H
H
i Hiqi
)
. Therefore, we obtain (27).
Substituting (6) and (27) into (7), we obtain the achievable sum-rate as
lim
PR→∞
R2Ps =
1
2
log2
1
1− f(qA,qB) (28)
where
f(qA,qB) ,
|qHAHHAHBqB|2(
1 + ‖HBqB‖2
) (
1 + ‖HAqA‖2
) . (29)
From (28), we see that to maximize limPR→∞R2Ps , we should maximize f(qA,qB). An upper
bound of f(qA,qB) is,
f(qA,qB) <
|qHAHHAHBqB|2
‖HBqB‖2‖HAqA‖2
≤ 1, (30)
and this upper bound can be approached when PA →∞ and PB →∞, i.e.,
f¯(qA,qB) , lim
PA→∞,PB→∞
f(qA,qB) =
|qHAHHAHBqB|2
‖HBqB‖2‖HAqA‖2
. (31)
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Therefore, the problem is transformed to maximize f¯(qA,qB), which is to find two vectors with
the minimum angle from the column spaces of UA and UB .
For the case NA +NB > NR, with probability one, we can find qA and qB such that
βHAqA = HBqB (32)
where β can be an arbitrary non-zero real number. Under this condition, f¯(qA,qB) can take its
maximum value of 1 in (30)1. Therefore, substituting the condition (32) into (28), we obtain
lim
PR→∞
R2Ps =
1
2
log2
1
1− f(qA,qB)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 + ‖HAqA‖2
) (
1 + ‖HBqB‖2
)
1 + ‖HAqA‖2 + |HBqB|2
≈ 1
2
log2
‖HAqA‖2‖HBqB‖2
‖HAqA‖2 + ‖HBqB‖2
if PA →∞, PB →∞.
At last, we maximize over the possible alignment directions and obtain the first part of Proposition
1.
On the other hand, if NA +NB ≤ NR, we have,∥∥qHBHHBHAqA∥∥
(a)
=
∥∥qHBRHBUHBUARAqA∥∥
(b)
≤ σmax
(
UHBUA
) ‖RAqA‖ ‖RBqB‖
(c)
= σmax
(
UHBUA
) ‖UARAqA‖ ‖UBRBqB‖
(d)
= σmax
(
UHBUA
) ‖HAqA‖ ‖HBqB‖ (33)
where (a) and (d) are from (26), (b) is from the singular value decomposition of UHBUA and the
equality can be achieved by letting qA = R−1A ψmax
(
UHAUBU
H
BUA
)
and qB = R−1B ψmax
(
UHBUAU
H
AUB
)
where the upper triangle matrices Ri ∈ CNi×Ni are invertible, and (c) is from qHi RHi Riqi =
qHi R
H
i U
H
i UiRiqi. Substituting (33) back to (28), we obtain the second part of Proposition 1.
Notice that we always have σmax
(
UHBUA
)
< 1 when NA+NB ≤ NR. The proof is as follows.
1An algorithm to find qA and qB was shown in [29, Lemma 1].
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First, as
∥∥qHBHHBHAqA∥∥ ≤ ‖HAqA‖ ‖HBqB‖ and the equality in (b) can be achieved, we
know that σmax
(
UHBUA
) ≤ 1. Second, if σmax (UHBUA) = 1, there is an intersection subspace
between the space span(HA) and span(HB) such that βHAqA = HAqA where β is a real
number. However, according to dimension theorem [30] and because the entries of the channel
matrices are generated from continuous distribution, we have
dim(span(HA) ∩ span(HA))
= dim(span(HA)) + dim(span(HB))− dim(span([HA,HB]))
= NA +NB − (NA +NB)
= 0.
Consequently, there is no intersection subspace and we have σmax
(
UHBHA
)
< 1.
Thus, the proof of Proposition 1 is completed.
Proposition 1 is essentially similar as the so-called signal alignment. In [29], this technique was
first proposed to achieve the degrees of freedom of the MIMO Y channel which is a generalized
two-way relay channel with three users. The key idea of the signal alignment is to align the
two desired signal vectors coming from two users at the receiver of the relay to jointly perform
detection and encoding for network coding. Specifically, if NA+NB > NR, there is intersection
subspace between the column spaces of Hi with probability one and thus there exists β ∈ R
such that (32) holds. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the secure beamformers at the two source nodes are
chosen such that the two received signals align in the same direction at the relay node. Intuitively,
aligning the signal vectors at the relay node will hinder the relay node decode the source messages
and make the system more secure. After self-interference cancellation, the two source nodes will
obtain the desired signal. The maximum secrecy sum rate goes to infinity as the source powers
approach infinity. On the other hand, if NA +NB ≤ NR, there is no intersection subspace with
probability one and there is an upper bound for the maximum secrecy sum rate. Specifically,
Ui is the orthonormal basis of the column space of Hi. Thus, arccos
(
σmax
(
UHAUB
))
, is the
minimum angle between any two vectors from the respect two column spaces. Actually, it is
called the minimum principal angle of these two subspaces [31].
Proposition 2 (3P). When PR → ∞, PA → ∞ and PB → ∞, the maximum secrecy sum rate
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of the three-phase two-way relay scheme is,
R3Pmax ≈
∑
i∈{A,B}
Θi, (34)
where
Θi ∈
[
1
3
[
log2
(
1
2
+ λmax
(
THi Ti,H
H
i Hi
))]+
,
1
3
[
log2
(
1 + λmax
(
THi Ti,H
H
i Hi
))]+]
,
if Ni ≤ NR and
Θi =
1
3
[
log2
(
3
2
Pi
)
+ log2
(
λmax
(
HNi T
H
i TiH
N
i
))]
,
if Ni > NR.
Proof: See Appendix F.
Proposition 2 shows that the secrecy sum-rate of the three-phase scheme will reach a floor if
the untrusted relay has more antennas than the two source nodes.
Proposition 3 (DT). When PA → ∞ and PB → ∞, the maximum secrecy sum rate of the
two-way direct transmission scheme is
RDTmax ≈
∑
i∈{A,B}
Ωi, (35)
where
Ωi =


1
2
[
log2 λmax
(
THi Ti,H
H
i Hi
)]+
, if Ni ≤ NR
1
2
[
log2 Pi + log2 λmax
(
HNi T
H
i TiH
N
i
)]
, if Ni > NR
,
and the optimal beamforming qDTi is given in (47).
Proof: This lemma is based on [24, Lemma 7]. Here, we assume that the entries of the chan-
nel matrices are generated from continuous distribution. As a result, Rank(Hm×n) ≥ min{m,n}
with probability one. In addition, the condition HNi THi 6= 0 in [24, Lemma 7] is also satisfied
with probability one.
As shown in Proposition 3, the secrecy sum-rate of the direct transmission scheme will also
reach a floor if untrusted relay has more antennas than the source nodes. This is similar to the
three-phase case.
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From Proposition 1, 2, and 3, we find that the asymptotic comparison among these three
schemes depend not only on the antenna numbers NA, NB , NR but also on specific channel
realizations. In the following, we only present the comparison results in two cases.
Corollary 1. When PR → ∞, and NA ≤ NR, NB ≤ NR, NA + NB > NR, the maximum
of secrecy sum rate of the two-phase two-way relay scheme keeps increasing when the two
source powers PA and PB increase while the maximum of secrecy sum rates of two-way direct
transmission and three-phase scheme both approach constants. Thus, we have
R2Pmax ≥ max
{RDTmax,R3Pmax} . (36)
Proof: It can be easily verified from Proposition 1, 2 and 3.
Remark 1. As shown in [24], [28] for two-way direct transmission, in the infinite power case,
the infinite maximum secrecy sum rate needs NA > NR or NB > NR. Proposition 1 reveals that
with the signal alignment techniques at the untrusted relay, the infinite maximum secrecy sum
rate only needs NA + NB > NR, which lowers the requirement of the numbers of antennas at
the two sources. The result clearly demonstrates the benefits of signal alignment for physical
layer security, which is the unique feature in two-way relaying.
Corollary 2. When PR →∞, PA →∞, PB →∞ and NA > NR, NB > NR,
RDTmax ≥ R3Pmax. (37)
Proof: When Ni > NR, we have
RDTmax =
∑
i∈{A,B}
1
2
[log2Pi +O (log2Pi)] (38)
R3Pmax =
∑
i∈{A,B}
1
3
[log2Pi +O (log2Pi)] (39)
where the order notation O (P ) means that O (P ) /P → 0 as P → ∞. Thus, the Corollary 2
follows.
From this Corollary we see that when the number of antennas at each source node is larger
than the number of antennas at the relay node, direct transmission performs better than the
three-phase two-way relaying at high SNR.
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B. The Case of High Relay Power and Low Source Powers
Proposition 4 (2P). When PR → ∞, PA → 0 and PB → 0, the optimal source beamforming
vectors of the two-phase two-way relay scheme are
qA =
√
PAψmax
(
HHAHBH
H
BHA
)
‖ψmax (HHAHBHHBHA) ‖
, (40)
qB =
√
PBψmax
(
HHBHAH
H
AHB
)
‖ψmax (HHBHAHHAHB) ‖
, (41)
and the maximum secrecy sum rate is
R2Pmax ≈
1
2 ln 2
PAPBλmax
(
HHAHBH
H
BHA
)
. (42)
Proof: See Appendix E.
Note that qA and qB are determined by the concatenated channel HHAHB.
Proposition 5 (3P). When PR → ∞, PA → 0 and PB → 0, the maximum secrecy sum rate of
the three-phase two-way relay scheme satisfies
1
2 ln 2
∑
i∈{A,B}
[
Piλmax
(
THi Ti −
1
2
HHi Hi
)]+
≤ R3Pmax ≤
1
2 ln 2
∑
i∈{A,B}
Piλmax
(
THi Ti
)
.
Proof: Substituting the above upper bound and lower bound of limPR→∞R3Ci¯i given in (56)
into the (18), we can easily prove Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 (DT). When PA → 0 and PB → 0, the maximum secrecy sum rate of the two-way
direct transmission scheme is,
RDTmax ≈
1
2 ln 2
∑
i∈{A,B}
[
Piλmax
(
THi Ti −HHi Hi
)]+
and the optimal beamforming qDTi are given in (47).
Proof: It is easily obtained from (48) or [24, Lemma 6].
We find that different from the two-phase scheme, the secrecy sum rates of the direct transmis-
sion and the three-phase scheme are closely related to the term THi Ti − αHHi Hi (α = 0, 1, 12 ).
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Corollary 3. When PR →∞, PA → 0 and PB → 0, we have
R3Pmax ≥ RDTmax ≥ R2Pmax.
Proof: This corollary can be easily obtained from Proposition 4, 5 and 6. Since HHi Hi are
positive semidefinite matrices, λmax
(
THi Ti − 12HHi Hi
) ≥ λmax (THi Ti −HHi Hi). Therefore,
the three-phase two-way relay scheme is better than direct transmission scheme. In addition,
R2Pmax approaches zero faster than the other two schemes. Thus, the proof of Corollary 3 is
completed.
This Corollary clearly suggests that when the two source powers are extremely low, it is the
best to apply the three-phase two-way relay scheme for secure transmission.
C. The Case of Low Relay Power
In this subsection, we present the asymptotic secrecy sum rate when relay power approaches
zero.
First, we briefly show when the relay power PR → 0, the maximum secrecy sum rate of the
two-phase two-way relay scheme R2Pmax approaches zero. As the relay power approaches zero, the
information rate through the relay link goes to zero, which means that R2PAB +R2PBA approaches
zero. On the other hand, the information rate leaked to untrusted relay R2PR is not related to the
relay power and does not approach zero. Therefore, the secrecy sum rate is zero when PR → 0.
Corollary 4. When the relay power PR → 0,
RDTmax ≥ R3Pmax ≥ R2Pmax. (43)
Proof: See Appendix G.
Corollary 4 shows that the direct transmission is the best when the relay power is low. In the
relay system without secrecy constraint, the similar conclusion hold [32].
we can now summarize the main comparison results in Table I. Utilizing Table I, we can
choose the best transmission scheme under different scenarios.
Note that besides the three schemes we considered in this work, four-phase one-way relay
scheme is also possible for secure bi-directional transmission. In this four-phase scheme, the
conventional one-way relaying is used twice for communications as A → R → B and B →
R → A. It can be shown that this four-phase scheme is the best when PR → ∞, PA → 0 and
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TABLE I
THE COMPARISON OF THE THREE SCHEMES IN TERMS OF THE MAXIMUM SECRECY SUM RATE. (IN THE TABLE, WE USE
‘DT’, ‘2P’, ‘3P’ TO DENOTE THE THREE SCHEMES. AND, A > B MEANS THAT SCHEME A IS BETTER THAN SCHEME B.)
Conditions Comparison
PR →∞
PA → 0, PB → 0 3P > DT > 2P (Corollary 3)
PA →∞, PB →∞
NA +NB > NR, NA ≤ NR, NB ≤ NR 2P > DT and 2P > 3P (Corollary 1)
NA > NR, NB > NR DT > 3P (Corollary 2)
Other cases Channel dependent
PR → 0 DT > 3P > 2P (Corollary 4)
PB → 0. For the other cases, this scheme is either suboptimal or the comparison depends on
the channel realization.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we perform simulation for all the cases discussed in section IV and V. In
the simulation, we assume that the channel reciprocity holds, i.e., HA = GTA, HB = GTB and
TA = T
T
B . The following example of channel coefficients realization (every entry of the matrices
is generated from CN (0, 1) distribution) is used to show the asymptotical performance.
H¯A =


0.2686− 0.0965i 0.1305− 1.2373i 0.6027 + 0.8313i
0.9510 + 0.8678i −0.4450+ 0.2224i −0.4630+ 0.3531i
0.4050− 0.7642i −0.6673− 0.7447i −0.0039+ 1.0646i
−0.9971+ 0.2578i −1.5888− 0.9503i −0.4514− 0.2944i
−1.1448+ 0.1069i −0.5209− 0.0569i 0.1598 + 0.0048i


H¯B =


0.3612 + 0.7099i −0.0464− 1.1249i 0.6175− 1.6643i
0.6236− 0.3490i 0.2193 + 0.8722i −0.8481− 0.1791i
−0.4814− 0.3466i 0.2838 + 0.3014i −0.3683 + 1.6906i
−0.2929 + 1.5306i −0.2643 + 0.8701i −1.6770 + 0.0192i
−0.0722 + 0.1413i 0.1504 + 0.9271i 0.9011− 0.3934i


T¯A =


0.0538 + 1.3647i 1.1100− 0.5711i −0.5226− 0.0653i
0.9241− 0.9370i −0.5684− 1.1719i −0.3993− 0.6427i
−0.0592− 1.2997i −0.9250 + 0.1194i 0.1469 + 0.4010i


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If the channel matrix we need is smaller than the dimension of the above matrices, we simply
choose the left upper part of the corresponding matrix. For instance, if NA = 2, NR = 3, we
choose HA = H¯A(1 : 3, 1 : 2).
Note that Algorithm 1 and 2 are not guaranteed to find the optimal solution and the convergent
point may be far from the optimal solution. A method to cope with this problem is to randomly
generate multiple initializations and choose the one with the best performance. Fig. 3 illustrates
the convergence behavior of Algorithm 1 with different initializations. It is seen that when
the initialization vectors qA and qB are chosen based on the signal alignment technique, the
algorithm converges faster than the case of random generated vectors. Thus, in the rest of our
simulation, we choose the asymptotic optimal beamforming vectors shown in Section IV as the
initial points of qA and qB .
A. High Relay Power and High Source Powers
Fig. 4, 5 and 6 compare the secrecy sum rates obtained by different schemes. Here the relay
power is fixed at PR = 40dB, but the source powers are changing. The results for the two-phase
and three-phase two-way relay scheme are obtained using the Algorithm 1 and 2 proposed in
Section III. For the direct transmission, we use the closed-form expression 48 given in Appendix
A.
Case 1) NA = 2, NR = 3, NB = 2: This is an example of the case when NA < NR,
NB < NR and NA + NB < NR. The curve for signal alignment of 2P is obtained by forcing
βHAqA = HBqB . Fig. 4 clearly verifies the importance of signal alignment for security as
analyzed in Corollary 1. We see that in Fig.4 the maximum secrecy sum rate of two-phase
scheme goes to infinity with the increase of the source powers, while that of the other two
schemes reach floors. Under this channel setup, the upper bound of the secrecy sum rate of the
direct transmission scheme is about 1.82bps/Hz and that of three-phase scheme is 1.48bps/Hz.
Case 2) NA = 3, NR = 2, NB = 3: This is an example of the case when NA > NR and
NB > NR. As shown in Fig. 5, the maximum secrecy sum rate for these schemes all approach
to infinity as the powers increase. We find that the direct transmission scheme is the best. This
agrees with our analysis in Corollary 2. Actually, as shown in (38) and (39), the degrees of
freedom of the direct transmission scheme is one and the degrees of freedom of the three-phase
scheme is 2
3
. In this case, although the signal alignment of the two-phase scheme is feasible, the
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direct transmission scheme is better than the two-phase scheme.
Case 3) NA = 2, NR = 5, NB = 2: This is the scenario when NA + NB ≤ NR. Under
this condition, all the schemes have upper bounds for their secrecy sum rates. The comparison
results are shown in Fig. 6. It is shown that the two-phase scheme is the best. We also plot the
curve for two-phase scheme when PR = 50dB. The curve can approach the upper bound more
closely than the curve when PR = 40dB. This implies that to approach the upper bound given
in (25), we need the powers of all the three nodes go to infinity and the relay power should be
much larger than the source powers. In this case, although the signal alignment of the two-phase
scheme cannot be achieved, the two-phase scheme is better than the direct transmission scheme.
From Fig. 4 and Fig. 6, we can see that increasing the number of antennas at the relay reduces
the performance. This is in contrast to the relay system without secrecy constraints, where with
more antennas at the relay, the performance will be better.
B. High Relay Power and Low Source Powers
Fig. 7 shows the performance of three schemes when PR = 40dB and the source powers are
low. We find that the two-phase scheme is much worse than the other schemes and three-phase
scheme is better than the direct transmission scheme, which verifies Corollary 3. By careful
observation, we see that R2Pmax decreases to zero as twice faster as RDTmax and R3Pmax when the
source powers tend to zero. Moreover, we also find that the asymptotical results are quite accurate
when the source powers are low.
C. Low Relay Power
In Fig. 8, we compare the three schemes when the relay power is as low as -20dB. We find
that the maximum secrecy sum rate of two-phase scheme is close to zero and direct transmission
is better than three-phase scheme, which verifies Corollary 4. The reason is that the only link
A ⇆ R ⇆ B of the two-phase scheme is very weak while there are strong direct links in the
other two schemes with high source powers.
D. General Relay SNR and Fading Channels
We have considered the high relay power and low relay power case. In this subsection, we
consider the general relay power. For this case, this is no asymptotic results and we perform
23
simulation with 1000 different channel realizations (every entry of the matrices is generated from
CN (0, 1) distribution) and obtain average secrecy sum rate. For the two-phase and three-phase
scheme, the simulation results are obtained by Algorithm 1 and 2.
In Fig. 9, we compare the average secrecy sum rates of the three schemes with varying relay
power. The source powers are fixed at 15dB and NA = NB = 2, NR = 3. The average rate of the
direct transmission scheme does not change with the relay power as the relay does not transmit
in this scheme. The average rate of the three-phase scheme increases with the relay power and
has similar performance with direct transmission at high relay power. For the two-phase scheme,
as the relay power increases, the average rate rises from zero to as high as 2.2 bps/Hz. We can
see that the two-phase scheme is much better than the other two schemes when relay power
is high. The reason is that in this case, signal alignment can be achieved when PR is large as
NA +NB > NR.
In Fig. 10, we plot the average secrecy sum rate versus the relay antenna number. The source
node A and B both have three antennas. The relay power is 25dB and the source powers are 15dB.
From the figure, we see that the average rate of the direct transmission scheme monotonically
decreases with NR. The reason is that the untrusted relay will be more powerful to eavesdrop the
direct transmission signal as NR increases. For the two-phase transmission scheme, the average
rate achieves the largest value when NR = 4. The reason is that when NR is small, the relay
does not have enough abilities to help the two-way transmission and when NR is large, the relay
will be more powerful to decode the received signals. For the three-phase scheme, the average
rate also decreases with NR in this case.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated a MIMO two-way AF relay system where the two source nodes
exchange confidential information with an untrusted relay. For both two-phase and three-phase
two-way relay schemes, we proposed efficient algorithms to jointly design the secure source
and relay beamformers iteratively. Furthermore, we analyzed the asymptotical performance of
the secure beamforming schemes in low and high power regimes of the sources and relay.
Simulation results validate our asymptotical analysis.
From these results, we can conclude that the conventional two-way direct transmission is
preferred when the relay power goes to zero. When the relay power approaches infinity and
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source powers approach zero, the three-phase two-way relay scheme performs best. Moreover,
when all powers go to infinity, the two-phase two-way relay scheme has the best performance if
signal alignment techniques are used, which also lowers the requirement of numbers of antennas
at the source nodes for security.
APPENDIX A
SECURE BEAMFORMING OF TWO-WAY DIRECT TRANSMISSION SCHEME
For the two-way direct transmission scheme, the transmission consists of two time slots. In
the first time slot, A transmits while B and R listen. During the second time slot, B transmits
while A and R listens. The received signals at B and R in the first time slot are respectively
given by
yDTB = TAqAsA + nB, (44)
yDTR1 = HAqAsA + nR1, (45)
and the received signals in the second time slot are similar.
An achievable secrecy sum rate of this two-way direct transmission scheme given by [28] is,
RDTs =
∑
i∈{A,B}
1
2
[
log2
1 + qHi T
H
i Tiqi
1 + qHi H
H
i Hiqi
]+
. (46)
We want to maximize the secrecy sum rate RDTs subject to the source power constraints. Ac-
cording to [33], [28] and [24], the optimal beamforming qDTi of the two-way direct transmission
scheme is given by
qDTi =
√
PDTi ψmax(I+ P
DT
i T
H
i Ti, I+ P
DT
i H
H
i Hi)
‖ψmax(I+ PDTi THi Ti, I+ PDTi HHi Hi)‖
, i ∈ {A,B}, (47)
and the maximum secrecy sum rate is given by
RDTmax(PDTA , PDTB )
=
∑
i∈{A,B}
1
2
[
log2 λmax
(
I+ PDTi T
H
i Ti, I+ P
DT
i H
H
i Hi
)]+
, (48)
where the factor of 1
2
is due to the use of two orthogonal phases.
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∂B(A, µ)
∂A∗
= −
∑
i∈{A,B}
log2 e
VHGHi K
−1
i GiFHi¯qi¯q
H
i¯
HH
i¯
U−VHGHi K−1i GiFHi¯qi¯qHi¯ HHi¯ FHGHi K−1i GiFU
2
(
1 + qH
i¯
HH
i¯
FHGHi K
−1
i GiFHi¯qi¯
)
+µ
AUHHAqAq
H
AH
H
AU +AU
HHBqBq
H
BH
H
BU+A
P 2PR − Tr
(
AUHHAqAq
H
AH
H
AUA
H +AUHHBqBqHBH
H
BUA
H +AAH
) (51)
APPENDIX B
SEARCH A USING GRADIENT METHOD
Substituting (22) into (8), we obtain a subproblem of optimizing A given qA and qB as
follows,
min
A
−R2Ps (49a)
s. t. Tr
(
AUHHAqAq
H
AH
H
AUA
H (49b)
+AUHHBqBq
H
BH
H
BUA
H +AAH
) ≤ P 2PR . (49c)
The logarithmic barrier function associated with (49) is,
B(A, µ) = −R2Ps − µ ln
(
P 2PR − Tr
(
AUHHAqAq
H
AH
H
AUA
H
+AUHHBqBq
H
BH
H
BUA
H +AAH
)) (50)
where µ > 0 is the barrier parameter.
The gradient of B(A, µ) with respect to A is given by (51) shown at the top of the next page,
With this gradient, we use gradient descent method to search A.
APPENDIX C
SEARCH OPTIMAL qB GIVEN F AND qA IN TWO-PHASE TWO-WAY RELAY SCHEME
First, we rewrite (8) in the homogenized form with respect to qB , as (52) shown at the top of
the next page. Then, we can follow the same procedure in [34, Section III-B] or [24, Appendix
A] to find the optimal qB. The basic idea is to first relax (52) into a fractional semidefinite
programming problem, which is then transformed to a SDP problem using Charnes-Cooper
variable transformation. At last, the rank-one matrix decomposition theorem [35, Theorem 2.3]
is used. Here we omit the details.
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max
qB ,t
Tr



HHBFHGHAK−1A GAFHB 0
0 1



qBqHB qBt∗
qHB t |t|2




Tr



HHB ((1 + ‖HAqA‖2) I−HAqAqHAHHA )HB 0
0 1 + ‖HAqA‖2



qBqHB qBt∗
qHB t |t|2




(52a)
s.t. Tr



 I 0
0 0



qBqHB qBt∗
qHB t |t|2



 ≤ PB, (52b)
Tr



HHBFHFHB 0
0 0



qBqHB qBt∗
qHB t |t|2



 ≤ Pr − Tr{FFH}− Tr{FHAqAqHAHHAFH} ,
(52c)
Tr



0 0
0 1



qBqHB qBt∗
qHB t |t|2



 = 1. (52d)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
First, we consider the case where NR > NA +NB .
Without loss of generality, we can express Fi as
Fi =
[
V V⊥
] ai Bi
ci Di



 UHi
U⊥Hi

 (53)
where V is from (23) , V⊥ ∈ CNR×(NR−NA−NB) such that [V V⊥] is unitary , Ui is Hiqi‖Hiqi‖ ,
U⊥i ∈ CNR×(NR−1) such that
[
Ui U
⊥
i
]
is unitary, and ai ∈ C(NA+NB)×1, ci ∈ C(NR−NA−NB)×1,
Bi ∈ C(NA+NB)×(NR−1), Di ∈ C(NR−NA−NB)×(NR−1). Therefore, we obtain (54) shown at the
top of the next page. Therein, (a) is from the above property of Fi (53), (b) is from that
2∑
i=1
GAUiBiB
H
i U
H
i G
H
A is positive semidefinite matrix. We see that the information rate from B
to A R3PBA = log2(1 + qHBHHBHBqB + xBA) is not related to ci and Di and achieves a upper
bound when Bi = 0. Similarly, the information rate from A to B, R3PAB , is also not related to
ci and Di and achieves a upper bound when Bi = 0. In addition, the power consumed by the
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xBA , q
H
BH
H
BF
H
BG
H
A
(
GA
(
FAF
H
A + FBF
H
B
)
GHA + I
)−1
GAFBHBqB
(a)
= ‖HBqB‖2aH2 VHGHA
(
2∑
i=1
GAVaia
H
i V
HGHA +
2∑
i=1
GAVBiB
H
i V
HGHA + I
)−1
GAVa2
(b)
≤ ‖HBqB‖2aH2 VHGHA
(
2∑
i=1
GAVaia
H
i V
HGHA + I
)−1
GAVa2 (54)
relay is
Tr
(
FAHAqAq
H
AH
H
AF
H
A + FBHBqBq
H
BH
H
BF
H
B
+FAF
H
A + FBF
H
B
)
= ‖HAqA‖2
(‖a1‖2 + ‖c1‖2)+ ‖HBqB‖2 (‖a2‖2 + ‖c2‖2)
+
2∑
i=1
‖ai‖2 +
2∑
i=1
‖Bi‖2F +
2∑
i=1
‖ci‖2 +
2∑
i=1
‖Di‖2F
We find that the relay power is increased when Bi, ci, Di is not zero. Therefore, it leads to
Bi = 0, ci = 0 and Di = 0.
When NR ≤ NA +NB , we can express Fi as
Fi = V
[
ai Bi
] UHi
U⊥Hi

 (55)
where V is from (23) , Ui is Hiqi‖Hiqi‖ , U⊥i ∈ CNR×(NR−1) such that
[
Ui U
⊥
i
]
is unitary, and
ai ∈ CNR×1, Bi ∈ CNR×(NR−1). Similar as the above case, we can prove that the optimal Bi = 0.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Plugging the condition PA → 0, PB → 0 into (27), we have
lim
PR→∞
R2Ps
=
1
2
log2
1
1− qHBHHBHAqAqHAHHAHBqB
(1+qHBHHBHBqB)(1+qHAHHAHAqA)
= −1
2
log2
(
1− q
H
BH
H
BHAqAq
H
AH
H
AHBqB
(1 + qHBH
H
BHBqB) (1 + q
H
AH
H
AHAqA)
)
≈ −1
2
log2
(
1− qHBHHBHAqAqHAHHAHBqB
)
≈ 1
2 ln 2
∥∥qHBHHBHAqA∥∥2.
To maximize ‖qHBHHBHAqA‖2, we obtain Proposition 4.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Substituting the optimal relay beamforming structure (24) into (16), we obtain the third term
in (16) as follows,
qHBH
H
BF
H
BG
H
A
(
GA
(
FAF
H
A + FBF
H
B
)
GHA + I
)
−1
GAFBHBqB
= ‖HBqB‖2aH2 VHGHA
(
2∑
i=1
GAVaia
H
i V
HGHA + I
)
−1
GAVa2
(a)
≤ ‖HBqB‖2aH2 VHGHA
(
GAVa2a
H
2 V
HGHA + I
)
−1
GAVa2
(b)
= ‖HBqB‖2aH2 VHGHA
(
I−GAVa2
(
aH2 V
HGHAGAVa2 + 1
)
−1 ·
aH2 V
HGHA
)
GAVa2
= ‖HBqB‖2 ‖GAVa2‖
2
1 + ‖GAVa2‖2
≤ ‖HBqB‖2
where (a) is from that GAVa1aH1 VHGHA is positive semidefinite, (b) is from the matrix inverse
lemma.
29
The above third term in (16) also has a lower bound by simply letting a1 = a2 = a¯,
qHBH
H
BF
H
BG
H
A
(
GA
(
FAF
H
A + FBF
H
B
)
GHA + I
)−1 ·
GAFBHBqB
= ‖HBqB‖2aHVHGHA
(
2GAVaa
HVHGHA + I
)−1
GAVa
=
1
2
‖HBqB‖2
(
1− (1 + 2aHVHGHAGAVa)−1)
=
1
2
‖HBqB‖2 2‖GAVa‖
2
1 + 2‖GAVa‖2
→ 1
2
‖HBqB‖2 as PR →∞
Therefore, we have
1
3
log2
(
1 + qHi T
H
i Tiqi +
1
2
qHi H
H
i Hiqi
)
≤ lim
PR→∞
R3Pi¯i
≤ 1
3
log2
(
1 + qHi T
H
i Tiqi + q
H
i H
H
i Hiqi
)
. (56)
To prove Proposition 2, we first substitute the upper bound and lower bound into (18). After
that, the proof procedure of Proposition 2 is similar to the proof of [24, Lemma 7]. In addition,
we assume that the entries of channel matrices are generated from continuous distribution.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4
For fair comparison, we set Pi = PDTi = P 2Pi = 23P
3P
i , i ∈ {A,B} and PR = P 2PR = 23P 3PR .
When the relay power PR → 0, there are only direct links between the two source nodes for
the three-phase scheme. Thus, the maximum secrecy sum rate of the three-phase two-way relay
scheme R3Pmax is
R3Pmax (57)
≈ max
qA,qB
1
3
∑
i∈{A,B}
[
log2
1 + qHi T
H
i Tiqi
1 + qHi H
H
i Hiqi
]+
=
1
3
∑
i∈{A,B}
[
log2
(
λmax
(
I+ P 3Pi T
H
i Ti, I+ P
3P
i H
H
i Hi
))]+
=
1
3
∑
i∈{A,B}
[
log2
(
λmax
(
I+
3
2
PiT
H
i Ti, I+
3
2
PiH
H
i Hi
))]+
.
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In addition, we have
λmax
(
I+
3
2
PiT
H
i Ti, I+
3
2
PiH
H
i Hi
)
(a)
= λmax
(
3
2
PiT
H
i Ti −
3
2
PiH
H
i Hi, I+
3
2
PiH
H
i Hi
)
+ 1
= max
ψ
ψH
(
3
2
PiT
H
i Ti − 32PiHHi Hi
)
ψ
ψH
(
I+ 3
2
PiH
H
i Hi
)
ψ
+ 1
≤ max
ψ
3
2
ψH
(
PiT
H
i Ti − PiHHi Hi
)
ψ
ψH (I+ PiH
H
i Hi)ψ
+ 1
=
3
2
λmax
(
PiT
H
i Ti − PiHHi Hi, I+ PiHHi Hi
)
+ 1
(b)
≤ (λmax (PiTHi Ti − PiHHi Hi, I+ PiHHi Hi)+ 1) 32
(c)
=
(
λmax
(
I+ PiT
H
i Ti, I+ PiH
H
i Hi
)) 3
2 ,
where (a) and (c) are from λmax(A,B) = λmax(A−B,B) + 1, (b) is from 32x+ 1 ≤ x
3
2 when
x is a nonnegative real number.
Therefore, we obtain RDTmax ≥ R3Pmax when PR → 0. Together with R2Pmax → 0 when PR → 0,
we obtain Proposition 4.
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Fig. 3. Convergence behaviour comparison of different initialization methods for Algorithm 1. NA = NB = 2, NR = 3,
PR = 30 dB and PA = PB = 10 dB.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the three schemes in high power regimes when NA = 2, NR = 3, NB = 2 and PR = 40 dB.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the three schemes in high power regimes when NA = 3, NR = 2, NB = 3 and PR = 40 dB.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
PA=PB (dB)
Se
cr
ec
y 
su
m
 ra
te
 (b
ps
/H
z)
 
 
DT
Upper bound of DT (Prop. 3)
2P, PR=40dB
2P, PR=50dB
Upperbound of 2P (Prop. 1)
3P
Upperbound of 3P (Prop. 2)
Fig. 6. Comparison of the three schemes in high power regimes when NA = 2, NR = 5, NB = 2 and PR = 40 dB.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the three schemes with high relay power when NA = 2, NR = 3, NB = 2 and PR = 40 dB.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of the three schemes with low relay power. NA = 2, NR = 3, NB = 2 and PR = −20 dB.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the three schemes with varying relay power, PA = PB = 15 dB, NA = NB = 2, NR = 3.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of the three schemes with varying relay antenna number, PA = PB = 15dB, PR = 25dB.
